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The Italian Corte di Cassazione, Sezioni Unite, n. 25767/2015 (SS.UU.), in a recent case has decided on the 
wideness (strictness) of the legal capacity of the conceived but not yet born child in a hypothesis of missed 
diagnosis of a genetic disease.
In analyzing such decision, I will focus especially on:
I. burden of proof;
II. potential plaintis of such kind of action (parents, brother and sisters of the child and the child
her/himself );
III. comparative insights on how legislation, judges and scholars in other legal systems (Great Britain and
France) have managed with the oodgate argument, the rights of both the woman and the “unborn” child.   
I.  BURDEN OF PROOF
On this point, before this new decision, there were 2 contrasting judicial solutions (* and **). They diverge 
in how the plainti (woman) should prove the:
a) CAUSAL LINK between the doctor's breach of contract (more accurate assessment and duty of
information) and the woman's choice in order to interrupt or continue the pregnancy;
b) EXISTENCE OF LEGAL CONDITION TO INTERRUPT THE PREGNANCY after the period of 90 days from
conception.
once the abortive will is proved, in presence of adequate information on fetus malformation, the legal 
requisite for the pregnancy interruption occurs, as the knowledge and consciousness of the malformation 
would have created for sure the risk of a severe damage to the psychological health of the woman (critics 
by E. PALMERINI, Nascite indesiderate e responsabilità civile: il ripensamento della Cassazione, in NGCC, 2013, I, 
200).
SS.UU. the pregnant plainti must prove:
i. The existence of legal pre-requisites for the abortion.
ii. The will to abort.
In these directions further and specic themes of proof are: a) the relevant disease/malformation of the 
child; b) the omission of due information by the doctor; c) the severe risk for her physical-psychological 
health; d) the abortive choice.
iii. The damages arisen from the impossibility to exert the right to abortion, as the idea of damage in re ipsa
isn’t admissible “because it is necessary that the situation of severe risk for the physical or psychological health 
of the woman, as art. 6 lett. B) L. 194/1978 has changed from a potential risk into a concrete damage or loss, 
eventually veriable through a court appointed expert”.
i. On the existence of legal pre-requisites for abortion and ii. the will to abort.
The disagreement in previous decisions - about means of proofs on the real and actual will to interrupt 
the pregnancy, whereas adequately informed about the malformation and whereas the fetus disease is 
suitable to determine a severe risk for woman health – is solved by SS.UU. stating that the simple proof of 
the fetus anomaly is a presumptive evidence and it is consequently insucient to demonstrate the 
abortive will.
SOME SCOLARS 
agree with SS.UU., because this solution avoids the mistake “to identify the severe danger for woman 
psychological and physical health with the mere will to abort” (for all see, C. Castronovo, Eclissi del diritto 
civile, Milano, 2015, 93). The logic inference here criticized would be too generic and abstract and could 
be qualied as a presumptio juris tantum (inconclusive o rebuttable presumption). This is why the SS.UU. 
asks for a more rigorous proof of the concrete and specic will to abort, without giving up to the 
instrument of presumptio hominis (presumption of fact) and, at the same time, taking into consideration 
that the intention to interrupt the pregnancy has the nature of an intellective fact, of an internal will, 
which is not suitable to be object of direct experience, so that its proof can be only indirect. In this eld, 
in the absence of a presumptio iuris et de iure (irrebuttable or conclusive presumption), the help of 
presumptions of fact is unavoidable, so that from a known and denite fact we can infer an uncertain and 
possible event.
The SS.UU. 
suggests some presumptive evidence of the abortive will, such as: “the request for a medical consultancy 
to ascertain the health condition of the fetus, the precarious psychophysical conditions of the woman, which 
could be veried by a court appointed expert, previous manifestation of such will and intention, which could 
be proved though witnesses…”.  
iii. On the damages:
SS.UU.’s decision puts limits on damages coming from the preclusion at the possibility to exert the 
abortive choice. The containment of damages for the violation of the health of the woman maybe is too 
much restrictive, as art. 6 of L. 194/1978 allows the interruption of the pregnancy in presence of a severe 
risk and not of a concrete and already actual damage. So, if the choice to interrupt the pregnancy after 
the rst 90 days is allowed in case of a concrete risk, it is possible that it should be taken in presence of a 
severe danger for the psychophysical integrity or the life of the woman, even if the latter is not necessarily 
destined to become an eective ad actual prejudice.
Actually, the woman's position results injured by the loss of the choice “in presence of a severe danger for 
her life or health”. So the “endangerment” is sucient, the statute doesn’t ask for an actual, concrete, 
certain prejudice.
The woman doesn’t have a right to abort, but to choose and in the case she had been deprived of such 
choice by the diagnostic and informative breach of contract, which occur not as a pure material and 
economic loss, but as a personal injury, which coincides with the deprivation of the utility that would 
have come out from the choice (in presence of the legal requisites).  
II. POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS
 SS.UU.: - the mother has the right to sue for damages, because she has been deprived of the right to 
self-determination in the abortive choice and also her health has been injured, as she is part of the 
agreement stipulated with the hospital and the doctor;
- the father, brothers and sisters of the child born with malformation, even if they are not part of that 
agreement, are indirectly damaged by the breach of contract, as they are going to suer for the disruptions 
of family dynamics and nancial hardship associated with caring for the crippled child.
- the crippled child has been the center of a deep interpretative disagreement:
PERSONAL INSIGHTS
The issue is at the centre of a huge and controversial debate, inuenced by ethical, religious or lay insights. 
But it’s important to remember that the genetic malformation is a fatality rather than a damage. It cannot 
be considered neither as a damage to health (as some scholars think, for all see G. Cricenti, Meglio non 
essere mai nati? Il diritto a non nascere rivisitato, in RCDP, 2013, 333) nor as a limitation of life conditions 
(danno esistenziale) due to any other human agent (suggested by Cass. N. 16754/2012). 
This reconstruction hides the attempt to recognize forms of legal protection (of economic nature) from a 
tragedy, but destiny is part of human life and it escapes human control. Scholars and judges don’t have to 
lose the dimension and the limits of their role.
The answer that contemporary State has given to such kind of diculties is the provision of social services, 
social assistances and welfare policies in general. The solution cannot consist in reverting the economic 
weight of the malformation and of the consequent limited life on the doctor, who is not responsible of the 
illness only because his intervention would have contributed to a dierent course of events, which, in any 
case, would never be a less limited life for the born child.
Moreover, by accepting the position which considers the birth with genetic malformation a damage, we 
incur in another contentious issue: can the parents, who sue as legal representatives of the child when they 
ask for compensation for a wrongful (not desired) life, replace their child in assessing if the birth (and life) 
can be considered as a loss suered? (R. Caterina, Le persone siche, Torino, 2012, 11).
SS.UU.
On this point the legal reasoning starts from the issue “natural capacity to have rights and exert them” of the 
conceived and not already born child, which art. 1 cod. civ. expressly connects to the birth. A direct and 
original relationship between the hurting and the injured party is not necessary, as the hurting event can 
occur before the damage materializes. But the damage and the right to compensation become, 
respectively, relevant before the law (the rst) and exercisable (the right) only after the birth. 
From that moment (birth) when the conceived becomes a person, any deviation from the archetype 
“healthy human being”, which can be consequence of a fact attributable to any other agent, represents an 
injury to the person and, because of this, object of compensation.  (C. Castronovo, Eclissi del diritto civile, cit., 
90).
Generally speaking, the responsibility does not exclude that the harm can precede the event, but there 
must be a valid causal nexus between the event (lamented as damage) and the rst.
 “It does not pose any problem relating to the natural (personal) capacity of the conceived but not already birth 
child, as it is not necessary in order to recognize the right to sue for compensation”. 
“It is possible to be addressee of legal protection, without being entitled with natural/personal capacity”. 
Not subject but object of legal protection!
So, coming out from the cul-de-sac of the legal (natural) capacity of the conceived but not already born 
child (not a crucial issue according to P.G. Monateri, Il danno al nascituro e la lesione della maternità cosciente 
e responsabile, in Corr. Giur., 2013, 60), SS.UU.:
- claries that damage means loss of utility; 
- refuses the idea of presumptive damage or damage in re ipsa;
- concludes that in the specic case the genetic disease cannot be considered a damage, even in the case 
of a missed diagnosis, which has excluded the possibility for the woman to choose for the interruption of 
the pregnancy. In such situation there is not a deterioration of the condition of the born due to the doctor's 
conduct (even if negligent).
The correct diagnosis wouldn't have led to the elimination or attenuation of disease, but to the inexistence 
of the conceived. The damage would coincide with life and the absence of damage with death. The Italian 
legal system cannot admit to equalize the two situations: life, even if crippled, and death. So the damage, 
even if it exists, cannot be considered contra ius.
III. COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS ON THE FLOODGATE ARGUMENT
Allowing a claimant to recover in some peculiar situations might open the metaphorical "oodgates" to 
large numbers of claims and lawsuits or to abnormal and distortive results. The principle is most frequently 
cited in common law jurisdictions, and in English tort law in particular.
A oodgate eect is a situation in which a small action can result in a far greater eect with no easily 
discernible limits: a oodgate, which once opened, no matter how minutely, will allow water to ow from 
either side through the gate until both sides are balanced up. It may also be used to refer to the eect 
where, once a oodgate has been opened, water will gush out in a torrent through the gate, making it 
easier to continue to open the gate, but harder to close it.
UK
In common law legal systems, the term is used to illustrate a situation where a precedent will set the stage 
for repeated performances, the number of which is hard to control. It is expressed to be a constraint upon 
which a defendant will owe a duty of care; or a limitation upon the remoteness of damage for which a 
defendant should be held responsible for.
In English law the rst recorded reference to the oodgates principle was in 1888 in Victorian Railway 
Commissioners v Coultas. That case involved a pregnant woman (the claimant) whose husband had driven 
onto train tracks at a level crossing, and due to the negligence of the gate keeper, the couple was nearly 
struck by a high speed train. The plainti, Mrs Coultas, suered from a severe shock, leading to impaired 
memory and eyesight, and the loss of her unborn child. Nonetheless, the Privy Council held that she had 
no sustainable claim for damages, holding that:
Concerning the issues of proof, damages and potential plaintis (not the fetus after birth), the SS.UU. have 
followed the rationale of the oodgate argument to restrict or limit the right to make claims for damages. 
The Italian legal system seems oriented to safeguard life and doesn’t protect both the parents and child’s 
will to refuse a “minor generis” life in comparison with the one not aicted by the disease.
ABNORMAL RESULT: deciding for the liability of the doctor in cases of missed diagnosis of a genetic disease 
would imply the logic consequence that the child, once born, could sue for damages the mother, who, in 
presence of the requisites prescribed by art. 6 L. 194/1978, had decided to carry the pregnancy to term. 
FRANCE 
According to the majority of courts and scholars, procreation is conceived not only as a biological fact, but 
as a human event aected by the choices of those involved. This way, such event can be a source of 
responsibility, as the causal link is qualied as legal (legal) and can be found between the negligent missed 
diagnosis integrity imposed by the malformation. The malformed born baby and the limited physical is, at 
the same time, an individual and legal entity, as the Cour de Cassation, Assemblée pléniére, 17 November 
2000, has stated in the famous Perruche case. The rst (individual) is condemned to handicap by nature, but 
the second (legal entity) is victim of the wrongful birth, causally linked also to the missed diagnosis by the 
doctor.
SS.UU.
Dierently from the French model, the oodgate eect in the Italian SSUU legal reasoning is represented 
through the argument that if, in the presence of health risks, the birth depends on a free choice of the 
pregnant woman, this act of freedom takes an absorbent value from the causal nexus point of view, as long 
as it involves a choice taken without coercion.  In fact, the outcome of a free choice can never be 
considered obvious and sure. Consequently, also this event (the choice) should be considered a causal 
antecedent, which, even if not sucient to determine the damage, could have triggered through a 
dierent sequence of events leading to a dissimilar nal outcome. The correct diagnosis is not in itself 
capable of preventing the malformation, because this outcome should be the result of the pregnant 
woman's choice (no malformation in sense of no birth).
The doctor's duty consists in preventing or reducing the development of fetus anomalies, protecting the 
pregnant woman’s life and health, oering her the information and care needed so that she can give birth 
without physical and psychological damages and in full self-determination on such choice, with 
consciousness and free will.
The obligation to avoid the onset of genetic diseases is alien to the doctor’s duty. Not by chance, SSUU 
underlines that the L. 194/1978 aims at putting the woman in conditions for a free choice on maternity in 
the rst 90 days of pregnancy; while in the following period it allows only to preserve the life and/or health 
of the pregnant, in case she is exposed to severe and hard risks, even due to fetus malformation, giving up 
the new life in eri in order to preserve the already formed life. This balance of contrasting interests is 
coherent with the constitutional principle of non-equivalence of protection of the mother, who is an 
already existing person, and the fetus, which is not already as such (Corte Cost., 18 February 1975, n. 27, in 
Foro it., 1975, I, 515).
Conclusions
The oodgate argument seems here to enforce also a principle which inspires L.194/1978 and the 
Constitutional framework in such eld, according to which the interruption of pregnancy does not pursue 
purposes of programming the family ménage, neither birth control objectives or species' breeding goals.
Such legal reasoning is criticised by some scholars (P.G. Monateri, “La Marque de cain”, quoted, 295-302; A. 
Guarneri, Wrongful life, bébé èréjudice e il discusso diritto a nascere sano…o a non nascere, in Resp. civ. Prev., 
2001, 499 et seq.), who underlined the necessity to give space to damages for wrongful life as a reaction to 
the doctor's wrongful doing (missed diagnosis). 
But, in my opinion, such hermeneutic option goes beyond what the law provides and towards some 
paradoxes and abnormal outcomes, which I mentioned above. 
“It is a question of policy”, to use Lord Denning's words, and scholars and judges have a great function in 
policy making, that has to be exerted with the consciousness of their role’s limits and responsibility, avoiding 
paradoxical outcomes and nding solutions that do not go beyond the law. We have a political responsibility 
on the direction the legal system can take when we oer a certain interpretative option, instead of another, 
as our words – published in a review – or the judge ones (contained in a Court decision) will reach and be 
read by some one else (student, scholars, judges, general public…). 
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“ Damages arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, 
but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot under such circumstances, their 
Lordships think, be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things, 
would ow from the negligence of the gate-keeper. (…) Damages must be the natural 
and reasonable result of the defendant's act; such a consequence as in the ordinary course 
of things would ow from that act”.
"At bottom I think the question of recovering economic loss is one of policy. Whenever the 
courts draw a line to mark out the bounds of duty, they do it as matter of policy so as to 
limit the responsibility of the defendant. Whenever the courts set bounds to the damages 
recoverable - saying that they are, or are not, too remote - they do it as matter of policy so 
as to limit the liability of the defendant. In many of the cases where economic loss has 
been held not to be recoverable, it has been put on the ground that the defendant was 
under no duty to the plainti. ... In other cases, however, the defendant seems clearly to 
have been under a duty to the plainti, but the economic loss has not been recovered 
because it is too remote."
The case: In particular, the decision, here analyzed, aects the congurability of damages for 
the born child because of the impossibility for the mother to exercise the right to abortion, as 
the diagnosis was missing and she was not aware of the hard risk for her physical and 
psychological health coming from the birth of a child aected by “down syndrome”. The parents 
sued the hospital, the doctor and all the sta for damages, because they didn’t prescribe any 
blood and chemical exams to the pregnant woman, something that should normally be done at 
the 16th week of pregnancy, in order to exclude some genetic diseases. The pleading was 
centered on the damages aected by parents for the wrongful birth and by the daughter for 
the wrongful life of the born brother.
Wrongful birth: the personal damages 
suered by pregnant women, who have not 
had the possibility of self-determining in the 
prosecution of the pregnancy in case of 
pathological processes suered by the fetus; 
in particular, in those cases when a disease 
exposes herself and her health to a severe risk 
(a pre-condition for abortion, according to 
the Italian L. 194/1978), caused by the 
doctor's breach of contract and, in particular, 
because of the latter not informing the 
patient of the illness suered by the fetus. 
Wrongful life: the damages suered directly by 
the conceived but not yet born fetus, because of 
the missed abortion; this category of damages 
has been invoked often by parents in case of 
fetus malformations o genetic diseases, when it is 
not possible to ascertain the doctor's 
responsibility for the child's health damages, 
since the disease preexisted to medical 
treatment and intervention. The wrongdoing 
concerns only the lack of diagnosis and of 
subsequent information, as the woman 
consequently could not exert her right to choose 
abortion and the child was born, while she/he 
shouldn’t have. 
After years of contrasting decisions SS.UU., has 
stated that there is no place for a “right to birth 
only if healthy” in the Italian legal system.
* EASY PROOF FOR PLAINTIFF: “it is reasonable, as
well as entirely likely, that the woman would have 
stopped the pregnancy if adequately informed of the 
fetus disease” (Cass. N. 6735/2002-Cass. N. 
1444889/2004; Cass. N. 13/2010; Cass. 
N.15386/2011). This position is based on a general 
presumption under which it is sucient that the 
woman demonstrates that she had asked for 
genetic exams in the pre-birth phase in order to 
deduct that she would have interrupted the 
pregnancy if adequately informed of the genetic 
disease suered by the child, as it is implicit that 
these circumstances imply “the hard risk for the 
woman's psychological health”, prescribed under L. 
194/1978 (Cass. N. 22837/2010). 
** HARDER PROOF FOR PLAINTIFF: such solution 
refuses the general presumption mechanism and 
the idea of deducting an uncertain fact (the choice 
to interrupt the pregnancy) from a certain one (the 
request for biogenetic exams) and asks for a more 
specic proof of the indisputable evidence of the 
intention to abort in case of fetus malformation, 
for example the explicit and previous declaration 
of such intention (witnesses). The mere request for 
biogenetic exams and pre-birth diagnosis is a 
single and simple presumptio hominis 
(presumption of fact), which alone is insucient to 
prove an interior and hypothetic will. It’s the 
woman’s duty to add further elements of fact in 
order to satisfy her burden of proof, as “what has 
concretely happened after can be evaluated as 
simple clue, to conrm other elements, but not as a 
plain proof and unique one”.
Both positions agreed that
1) STRICT: The right for compensation of the fetus
is limited to injuries of psycho-physical integrity 
caused by diagnostic or therapeutic mistakes of 
the hospital and of the doctors.   
The legal system doesn’t provide for “a right to 
no-birth if not healthy” in the case of genetic 
malformation not discovered in the diagnostic 
steps and not communicated to the pregnant 
mother (but not caused by the doctor), in order to 
allow her the choice to continue or interrupt the 
pregnancy. Such right would become a right that 
the born child could exert also against the mother 
who had decided to continue the pregnancy 
(Cass. N. 14488/2004; Cass. N. 16123/2006; Cass. N. 
10741/2009) and a right with no holder in any 
case (birth or no-birth).
2) WIDER: postponing the onset of the damage on the
malformed child after birth, this guideline does not see 
the damage on the born child as the injury to “the right 
not to be born if not healthy” (or to born only if healthy), 
but as the harm coming from being born unhealthy, as 
it is “undeniable that the exercise of the right to 
compensation by the minor child is not in any way 
attributable to an impersonal “not to be born”. 
The compensation, instead, is attributable to the 
single, unique human history linked to that specic 
individual who, by suing for damages, is asking the 
court for the plain respect of the constitutional 
protection, in order to be enabled to live less 
uncomfortably, aspiring to a less incomplete 
realization of his rights, both as an individual and as a 
social part (art. 2 Cost) (Cass. N. 16754/2012). For the 
same position in scholarly writings, see P. G. Monateri, 
“La marque de Cain” la vita indesiderata, e le reazioni del 
comparatista al distillate dell’alambicco, in Un bambino 
non voluto è un danno risarcibile?, in A. D’angelo (ed.), 
Milan, 1999, 295, who talks about a new hypothesis of 
“danno esistenziale”.
In Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27 Lord Denning MR recognised  this 
explicitly:
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